ONLINE PAPERS
 

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(All the papers are in .pdf format.
You will need Acrobat Reader 5.0.)

• "Is Causation a Genuine Relation?" in Real Metaphysics: Festschrift for D. H. Mellor, ed. G. Rodriguez-Pereyra and H. Lillehammer, Routledge, 2002.

Abstract:  This paper defends the view that causation is an intrinsic relation.  D. H. Mellor has argued that causation is not a real relation at all because absences can be causes and effects.  If it is not a relation, it cannot be an intrinsic relation.  David Lewis has called this the Missing Relatum Objection.  As well as endorsing this objection, Lewis has also argued that the intuition about the intrinsicality of causation does not fit cases of double prevention.  In this paper I attempt to give a treatment of causation involving absences that supports the idea that the truthmakers for all causal claims are intrinsic relations or processes.  The central feature of the treatment is the relativisation of the notion of an intrinsic property or relation to a system of a certain kind.
 
• "Mental Causation for Event Dualists", forthcoming in Mind and Language, 2002.

Abstract:  This paper is a critical review of Paul Pietroski's book Causing Actions. It surveys the book's event dualist solution to the problem of mental causation and makes three critical comments that cast doubt on the adequacy of the solution.

• "Counterfactual Theories of Causation", online Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.

Abstract:  The basic idea of counterfactual theories of causation is that the meaning of a singular causal claim of the form "Event c caused event e" can be explained in terms of counterfactual conditionals of the form "If c had not occurred, e would not have occurred".  Analyses along these lines have become popular in the last quarter of the twentieth century, especially since the development in the 1970’s of possible world semantics for counterfactuals.  The best known counterfactual analysis of causation is David Lewis’ (1973b) theory.  However, intense discussion over twenty years has cast doubt on the adequacy of any simple analysis of singular causation in terms of counterfactuals.  Recent years have seen a proliferation of different refinements of the basic idea to achieve a closer match with commonsense judgements about causation.

• "Capacities, Natures and Pluralism: A New Metaphysics for Science?", forthcoming in Philosophical Books, 2002.

Abstract:  The paper is a critical discussion of themes from Nancy Cartwright's book The Dappled World.  The paper considers how to understand Cartwright's notion of a nomological machine and the capacities that constitute it.  It also scrutinises her critique of fundamentalism or a belief in the unity of the sciences.

• "Difference-Making in Context", forthcoming in Counterfactuals and Causation, eds. J. Collins, N. Hall, and L. Paul, MIT Press, 2002.

There are six figures to be inserted in the paper. Click here for figure 1; figure 2; figure 3; figure 4; figure 5; figure 6.

Abstract:  Many different approaches to the conceptual analysis of causation are guided by the idea that a cause is something that makes a difference to its effects.  There is no better example of this approach than David Lewis's analysis of causation in terms of counterfactuals.  In this paper I argue that Lewis's analysis cannot be correct as it generates countless spurious causes for any given effect.  The key to understanding causes as difference-makers is to accept that causal discourse, both commonsense and scientific, is context-dependent.  In the paper I attempt to spell out an alternative counterfactual account of causes as difference-makers in a way that recognises the context-sensitivity of causal discourse.
 

• "The Causal Efficacy of Mental States", forthcoming in The Structure of the World: the Renewal of Metaphysics in the Australian School, ed. J. M. Monnoyer, Vrin Publishers, 2001.

Abstract:  A much discussed argument, which Jaegwon Kim, has called the Exclusion Argument, seems to show that mental states cannot have causal efficacy over and above that of the brain states upon which they supervene.  The argument has been endlessly dissected by philosophers, many of whom reject the conclusion of the argument by rejecting one or other of its premises.  I agree that this is right response, but differ in my diagnosis of the argument's error. I claim that the argument trades on the little noticed assumption that causation is an absolute relation.  However, I argue that we actually conceptualise causal relations quite differently.  Recognition of this fact opens up the possibility of seeing that there can be different levels of causation: there may be a level at which mental states cause behaviour by way of distinctive psychological pathways and a different level at which brain states cause behaviour by way of distinctive neural pathways.

• "Review of L. Sklar’s Theory and Truth and I. Niiniluoto’s Critical Scientific Realism", in the Times Literary Supplement, 5119 (May 11, 2001), p. 30.

 

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Email & Web:
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